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Many taxpayers truthfully declare their income to the tax administration. Why? In this paper we have found a significant correlation between tax morale and tax evasion, controlling a variety of factors. Furthermore we have analysed tax morale as dependent variable and studied the determinants that shape it. The results indicate that factors such as the tax administration, tax system, tax awareness, compliance perceptions, trust in officials and others, and the willingness to obey have a relatively strong impact on tax morale.
I. INTRODUCTION Adams' book (1993) starts with the inscription over the entrance to the Internal Revenue Service building: "Taxes are what we pay for a civilized society". An essential question is to which extent individuals are willing to pay this price. The probability of being audited by the tax administration is rather low. Elffers (2000) points out that "the gloomy picture of massive tax evasion is a phantom" (p. 185). A big share of revenues is collected without a draconian enforcement system. Co-operation in tax compliance experiments is higher than neoclassical models would predict. What are the reasons? Is tax compliance influenced by tax morale? What are the determinants that shape tax morale? The main purpose of this paper is to
give answers to these important questions.
To get empirical insights we are going to work with the Taxpayer Opinion Survey (TOS) . In general, surveys give the opportunity to study a variety of factors, especially attitudes. It is even possible to integrate questions about taxpayers' behaviour. On the other hand, we find many critical aspects, as, e.g., possibly biased samples that are not representative. Tax evasion is a sensitive area, and low response rates can create biases. Thus, a certain response rate is essential to get good data. The problem with delicate questions is to obtain honest answers. Jackson and Milliron (1986) point out that the technique used to solicit responses and the way questions are framed have an effect on the respondents' answers. One way to deal with this problem is to conduct and to evaluate a variety of surveys to get a general picture of the main
variables. An excellent method would be to conduct panels or to do regular surveys in different countries, similar to the structure of the TOS In the last years, social researchers have intensively used surveys to investigate the causes and consequences of social capital or compliance behaviour. One reason might be that survey research uses more sophisticated statistical techniques and design compared to early years.
II. TAX MORALE AND TAX EVASION
Can we find a link between tax morale and tax evasion? Spicer and Lundstedt (1976) pointed out that the choice between tax compliance and evasion is not only made on the grounds of sanctions but also on the grounds of a set of attitudes and norms. According to Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) and Lewis (1982) behaviour can be predicted from attitudes and subjective norms. This might indicate that there is a connection between tax morale and tax compliance behaviour. The tax compliance literature has shown the relevance of going beyond a neoclassical approach when trying to understand why citizens pay taxes. Allingham and Sandmo's (1972) groundbreaking model which assumes that the extent of tax evasion is negatively correlated with the probability of detection and the degree of punishment has been widely criticized (e.g., Graetz and Wilde, 1985; Alm, McClelland, and Schulze, 1992) . In many countries, the level of deterrence is too low to explain the high degree of tax compliance. To resolve this puzzle of tax compliance, many researchers have argued that tax morale can help explain the high degree of tax compliance (for an overview see Torgler, 2007) . Lewis (1982) points out that "it could be that tax evasion is the only channel through which taxpayers can express their antipathy … we can be confident in our general prediction that if tax attitudes become worse, tax evasion will increase" (p. 165, 177 ).
An increase in tax morale enhances the moral costs of behaving illegally and therefore reduces the incentives to evade taxes. It is a relevant issue to investigate whether differences in tax morale across countries are reflected in any differences in real, or observed, behaviours in these countries. Torgler and Schneider (2007) extend the previous empirical models of the shadow economy by showing that tax morale matters quite significantly in the determination of the size of the shadow economy providing strong robustness tests using international and within country panel data. Frey and Schneider (2000) point out that moral costs could act as a disincentive to be active in the underground economy: "A good citizen has moral qualms to undertake a forbidden activity. These moral costs are closely related to 'tax morale' which motivates citizens to pay their dues to the state" (p. 6).
Another possibility could be to compare the tax compliance results from experiments with a post-experiment questionnaire that helps to get information about subjects' attitudes (e.g., Bosco and Mittone 1997 Even researchers are not entirely sure about the effects of lowering tax rates. Graetz and Wilde (1985) point out that lowering tax rates is supported neither by theory nor by empirical evidence. Lower tax rates, for example, have also the effect of reducing the costs of underreporting.
It seems that taxpayers are more compliant than traditional models would predict. Thus, knowledge about tax morale could lead to a better income tax policy.
We are going to work with the Taxpayer Opinion Survey, collected in the United States in 1987 and providing a broad set of taxpayers' opinions and evaluations of aspects as, the tax system, the Internal Revenue Service, tax evasion, cheating on taxes etc. The TOS offers the possibility to separately analyse two determinants of tax evasion, overstating of deduction or expenses and underreporting income, as dependent variable.
From these considerations the following hypotheses can be derived: 
III. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION

Main Variables
Surprisingly, the TOS has not been used by many researchers (see, e.g., Smith 1992, Sheffrin and Triest 1992) . Even if the data set is relatively old, the huge amount of questions and the fact that not many papers have used the data set, makes it also attractive for newer research projects (see, e.g., Forest and Sheffrin 2002, using the 1990 TOS) . Furthermore, after 1990, the TOS has not been conducted any more. The sample of 2003 observations is reduced by the fact that taxpayers had sometimes the possibility to answer "not sure" or not to answer at all.
Tax morale can be defined as the attitude towards tax evasion. The advantage of the TOS data set is that we find quite a few questions. We are going to use the following questions (scale from 1 to 6, where 6 means not at all acceptable and 1 means perfectly acceptable):
1. Trading or exchanging goods or services with a friend or neighbour and not reporting it on your tax form (TM 1).
2. Reporting your main income fully, but not including some small outside income (TM 2).
3. Being paid in cash for a job and then not reporting it on your tax form (TM 3).
4. Not reporting some earnings from investments or interest that the government would not be able to find out about (TM 4).
5. Stretching medical deductions to include some expenses which are not really medical (TM 5).
Furthermore, the following questions have been asked (6=strongly disagree, 1=strongly agree)
6. With what things cost these days, it's okay to cut a few corners on your tax form just to help make ends meet (TM 6).
7. It's not so wrong to hold back a little bit of taxes since the government spends too much anyway (TM 7).
8. The chances of getting caught are so low that it is worthwhile trying to cut corners a little on (TM 8).
9. When you're not really sure whether or not you deserve a tax deduction, it makes sense to take a chance and take the deduction anyway (TM 9).
10.It is not so wrong to underreport certain income since it does not really hurt anyone (TM 10).
11.There is nothing wrong with interpreting the ambiguous or grey areas of the tax law to your own advantage (TM 11).
The literature strongly uses the justifiability of evasion as proxy for tax morale (Torgler 2007) . The advantage of these questions compared to other studies is a stronger realism due to concrete examples, focusing on the income reporting process and the over-deduction possibilities.
Tax evasion is measured with the following two questions: There are pros and cons on using such tax evasion measurements.
Looking at the empirical data, the advantage is that we hardly find data that tries to measure the extent of tax evasion in a survey. So, little empirical evidence is available. Lewis (1982) On the other hand, Lewis (1982) is aware of problems with such a procedure. People might refuse to answer or to take part in such a survey or moderate their views to reduce the possibility that information are used non-confidentially as, for example, to prosecute taxpayers. As a consequence, such an approach would generate a tendency to overestimate tax compliance. Lempert (1992) Table 2 indicates the marginal effect for the score 3 (probably overstated) and 4 (definitely overstated). The marginal effect indicates the change in the share of taxpayers (or the probability) belonging to a specific tax evasion level, when the independent variable increases by one unit. Only the marginal effects for the two highest tax evasion values are shown (in Table 2 ). As we can see, the marginal effect for score 3 is higher than for score 4. An increase in tax morale by one point reduces the share of persons indicating that they probably (definitely) have overstated deduction by around 2 (0.7)
percentage points.
Looking at the control variables we can see that females report a lower rate of tax evasion than males. However, the coefficient is not significant and the marginal effects are very small. On the other hand, a higher education has a positive effect on tax evasion. An increase in the education by one unit increases the share of persons indicating that they probably (definitely) have overstated deductions by around 1.4 (0.5) percentage points. Better educated taxpayers are supposed to know more about tax law and the possibilities to overstate deductions or expenses.
Elderly people evade taxes significantly less than younger individuals.
Furthermore, another reason might be, e.g., that estate taxes are likely to have smaller tax compliance disincentive effects on older people than on younger, as the tax burden has partly to be paid by the heirs. Tittle (1980) argues that older people are more sensitive to the threats of sanctions and over the years have acquired greater social stakes, as material goods and status, and depend on others' reactions, so that the potential costs of sanction increase. They have lived for a certain time in the same place and thus are more attached to the community (see Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann 1996) . There is no significant difference between races. Married people evade taxes significantly more often than singles. Being married rather than single increases the share of persons indicating that they probably (definitely) have overstated deductions by around 4 (1.6) percentage points. This result is in line with some studies in the United States which found that noncompliance is more common and of greater magnitude among married taxpayers (see Clotfelter 1983 , Feinstein 1991 . One reason could be that in the U.S., dual incomes are treated as one, being thus taxed in a higher bracket than two separate incomes (Hays 2000) . Similarly, a higher income leads to significantly higher tax evasion. An increase of the income increases the share of persons indicating that they probably (definitely) have overstated deduction. However, the marginal effects are quite low. Finally, there is no significant difference between the employment types, but the marginal effects indicate a higher tax evasion among part-time employees, unemployed and retired people compared to full-time employees. Table 1 The Effect of Tax Morale on Tax Evasion (Over-deduction)
Notes: Dependent variable: tax evasion on a four point scale. In the reference group are MALE, WHITE, FULL TIME EMPLOYED, SINGLE. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Under-Declaration
In the next step we are going to analyse under-reporting as dependent variable, using the same control variables. hypothesis 2 that the lower tax morale, the more individuals under-report their income. In all equations tax morale is highly significant. In Table 4 we are going to present the marginal effects of the robust significant coefficients. We can see that the tax morale marginal effects are greater compared to the equations using over-deduction as dependent variable, especially for the extreme value "definitely done under-declaration". In general the results indicate that there is a statistically significant correlation between tax morale and tax evasion, identifying 11 proxies of tax morale and distinguishing between over-deductions and underdeclaration. In all 22 equations the coefficients are highly significant.
Thus, tax morale seems to be a key determinant to understand tax compliance. Notes: Dependent variable: tax evasion on a four point scale. In the reference group are MALE, WHITE, FULL TIME EMPLOYED, SINGLE. Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The following factors are analysed:
• Tax authority
• Tax system
• Perception and experiences with deterrence factors and tax evasion
• Awareness of tax issues
• Trust in government, social capital and obedience
Tax Authority
Taxpayers' estimation of the tax authority might have an effect on tax morale. It depends on how they are treated by the administration. As Smith (1992) argues, "cycles of antagonism between the tax administration and the taxpayer might begin to break with a positive concession by the administrator" (p. 226). He points out that a respectful and fair treatment of taxpayers induces respect for the tax system and thus leads to co-operation. Feld and Frey (2002a) see the relationship between these two actors as a psychological contract:
"Tax authorities must acknowledge and support the contract with the taxpayers by acting in a respectful way towards them, but also by preventing honest taxpayers from being exploited in the process" (p. 4).
Using a data set of tax authorities' behaviour in Switzerland (26 cantonal tax authorities), they find that tax authorities of cantons with more direct participation rights treat taxpayers more respectfully and are less suspicious if taxpayers report too low incomes than the authorities in cantons with less direct democracy. On the other hand, not submitted tax declarations are more heavily fined. In a recent paper, Feld and Frey (2002b) continue on this framework and argue that tax morale is supported or even raised when tax officials treat taxpayers with respect and on the other hand is reduced when the administration considers taxpayers as individuals who have to be forced to pay the taxes: "The feeling of being controlled in a negative way, and being suspected of tax cheating, tends to crowd out the intrinsic motivation to act as an honorable taxpayers and, as a consequence, tax morale will fall. In contrast, if the tax official makes an effort to find out the reason for the error by contacting the taxpayer in an informal way, the taxpayer will appreciate this respectful treatment and tax morale will be upheld" (p. 4).
They divide respectful treatment, by the tax administration into two components (p. 5): (i) transparent and clear procedure, (ii) respecting taxpayers' character. Their empirical analysis shows that treating taxpayers respectfully reduces tax evasion.
With the same data used by Smith (1992) we expand the analysis, focusing on tax morale and using more variables to catch attitudes towards the tax administration: Cronbach's α for the items is 0.74, giving the possibility to put them as one index (average of the items).
JOB OF THE IRS (Internal Revenue Service
2. HONESTY AND FAIRNESS. The respondents were asked to agree or disagree with eight statements about the IRS (Cronbach's α = 0.83).
-The IRS employees are honest -you could never bribe them 
Fairness of the Tax System
A tax system must be fair in the view of the taxpayers. If a taxpayer feels that she/he is in a sort of unfair contract she/he will probably be less likely to comply. Taxpayers are more inclined to comply to the law if the exchange between the paid tax and the performed government services are found to be equitable. A number of survey research studies have reported a positive correlation between perceptions of fiscal inequity and tax evasion (Spicer 1974, Song and Yarbrough 1978) . We are going to use the following variables to consider the perceived fairness of the tax system:
1. How do you feel about the federal income tax system as it applies to the 1986 tax return -do you feel it is quite fair to most people (4), or reasonably fair (3), or somewhat unfair (2), or quite unfair to most people? (1) (first tax fairness variable).
2. The present tax system benefits the rich and is unfair to the ordinary working man or woman (1= strongly agree, 6= strongly disagree) (second tax fairness variable). Table 5 presents the results of the estimations. We find that tax fairness has a significant positive effect on tax morale. An increase in the perception scale of tax fairness by one unit raises the share of persons indicating the highest tax morale by 3 for tax fairness 1 and 2.4
percentage points for tax fairness 2.
Tax Complexity
Complexity may result in unintentional non-compliance if taxpayers have problems filing the tax form. Furthermore, complexity can reduce the moral costs of evading taxes. Such noncompliance differs from other crimes, because it can be argued that unintentional errors have been made due to misinterpretation of the rules. Honest persons will have higher filling costs and thus higher compliance costs. On the other hand, individuals who want to reduce these costs may either fail to take legitimate credits or may even claim credits without ascertaining eligibility. Krause (2000) states that when rules are complex, compliance and enforcement will be imperfect. Costs are imposed on the taxpayers and the tax administration, undermining the effectiveness of the tax policies. Tax examiners in the tax administration will have greater problems to identify a case of noncompliance and to discern whether the violation was deliberate or unintentional (Erard 1997) . This can increase tax collection costs. Furthermore, complicated tax laws are subject to a broad variety of interpretations (Krause 2000) . However, other studies have failed to document a negative relation between complexity and compliance (e.g., Yankelovich and Skelly 1984) .
Complexity may affect taxpayers' perceptions of the equity of the tax system. It can be argued that tax complexity and equity are positively related. A more complex tax law can help determine taxpayers' ability to pay and could stop those who would be able to exploit tax rules. On the other hand, additional compliance and administration costs incur (see Kaplow 1996) and taxpayers could be frustrated. A simpler tax law would reduce taxpayers' expenditure in time and money to comply with the tax law (see Blumenthal and Slemrod 1992) . Increasing tax complexity may move taxpayers' trade-off between costly compliance either by using own effort or external help (tax practitioners) and evading taxes towards the "exit" decision. Smith (1992) found that complexity significantly reduces the perceived IRS procedural fairness. On the other hand, Forest and Sheffrin (2002) did not find a systematic link between perception of complexity and perception of unfairness, using data from the 1990 TOS with similar questions. Contrary to Smith (1992) we only took one item to measure the complexity of the tax system: Thinking about how easy or difficult it is to fill out your tax form, how complicated do you think our federal income tax laws and rules are for your particular income situation (1= not at all complicated/very easy to understand, 6 = extremely complicated/very difficult to understand). Table 5 presents the results. We can see that complexity has the tendency to reduce tax morale. However, the marginal effects are small and the coefficient is not statistically significant.
Perception regarding Tax Evasion
The intensity of moral constraints might depend on how widespread evasion behaviour is in a group. The social constraint might be very small if individuals are aware that they are part of a minority who pays taxes.
People who used to pay taxes might get angry, which reduces the moral costs of evasion and increases the incentive to engage in tax evasion.
Individuals could react emotionally and very strongly to such perceived attitudes. If a taxpayer believes that tax evasion is common and notices that many individuals evade taxes, this could crowd out intrinsic motivation to comply with taxes. Evasion is a signal that intrinsic motivation is not recognised. Thus, taxpayers get the feeling that they can as well be opportunistic. Lewis (1982, p. 144) 
Awareness of Tax Issues
It might be interesting to analyse to which extent the awareness of tax issues has an impact on tax morale. Information acquirement and discussion depend on individuals' incentives. Gaining information and discussing this topic with other people imposes time costs on taxpayers.
In a discussion people have the opportunity to exchange arguments which raises the level of information of the participants. It also enhances the incentive to participate and to incur additional information costs.
People interact in a face-to-face situation and are able to identify the others' preferences. It could be argued that dissatisfaction with government or generally negative attitude towards the tax system might increase the incentives to talk to individuals to get a better idea about the opportunities to evade and the probability of getting caught.
A low awareness is linked with a higher uncertainty regarding the IRS process. Scholz and Pinney (1995) argue that the uncertainty about the probability of getting caught imposes sufficient difficulties for citizens to make them rely on heuristics to behave honestly. Tax compliance experiments have analysed the role of fiscal uncertainty by comparing the compliance behaviour when key fiscal parameters are known with certainty to the behaviour when these parameters are made uncertain. Alm, Jackson and McKee (1992) found in an experiment that introducing uncertainty in the fiscal parameters, the fine rate and the probability of detection increases tax compliance. Thus, better information and awareness of the IRS activities might have a negative effect on tax morale.
We have used the following questions to catch the awareness of the common to discuss such a sensitive topic with friends. Thus, someone who discusses IRS issues with friends does so with specific intentions.
The coefficient for the effects of RADIO INFORMATION is not significant. A radio is a medium that in general informs about different topics, and there is a low probability that it informs regularly about the IRS. Sensitive and specific topics are rather treated in a discussion among people than on the radio. We have also estimated equations looking at other media like TV and newspaper. The results are in line, not showing a significant effect on tax morale.
Trust and Obedience
Trust in Public Officials
In the last equations the relevance of trust and obedience to tax morale are analysed. In the tax compliance literature economists have recently started to pay attention to the determinant of trust (Slemrod 2002 , Torgler 2007 ). However, the concept of trust is not new. John Locke has already pointed out the relevance of trust in the interaction between citizens and the government. Trust in public officials might tend to increase taxpayers' positive attitudes and commitment to the tax system and tax-payment, which has finally a positive effect on tax compliance.
Taxes can be seen as a price paid for government's positive actions.
Thus, if taxpayers trust the public officials, they are more willing to be honest. If the government acts trustworthily, taxpayers might be more willing to comply with the taxes. Similar to the tax administration, the relationship between taxpayers and government can be seen as a relational contract or psychological contract, which involves strong emotional ties and loyalties. Such a psychological tax contract can be maintained by positive actions, based on trust.
The variable has been developed from the following question:
Public officials can usually be trusted to do what's right (strongly agree=4, mildly agree=3, mildly disagree=2, strongly disagree=1).
The results are in line with our hypothesis that there is a significantly positive correlation between trust in officials and tax morale. An increase in the trust scale by one unit increases the share of subjects indicating the highest tax morale by 3.5 percentage points.
Trust in other People
The TOS measures trust in a general way, asking respondents if they trust other people. Paldam and Svendsen (2000) point out that this might be the best available measure of social capital. Slemrod (1998) stresses that "in high-trust societies, individuals need to spend less to protect themselves from being exploited in economic transactions" (p. 29).
Thus, a high level of social capital facilitates a high level of government. People who trust each other are in a closer interaction, which might produce a positive attitude towards contributing to the public good and paying the taxes. The results in Table 5 indicate that higher social capital leads to a significantly higher tax morale. An increase in the scale of trust by one unit increases the share of subjects indicating the highest tax morale by 2 percentage points. as the goal to act appropriately, which is acquired through socialisation. cooperation specification) and 1304 (tax administration specifications). Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01< p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Marg. = marginal effect for the highest tax morale score.
Rules are like restrictions that reduce the individuals' possibility set. When people pay taxes, they obey the laws with respect to rules. Thus, one would predict that people with a higher rule obedience have a higher tax morale. Respondents in the TOS were confronted with the following question:
The most important thing a child should learn is obedience and respect for authority (strongly agree =4, mildly agree=3, mildly disagree=2, strongly disagree=1). Table 5 shows that a higher obedience and respect for the authority leads to a significantly higher tax morale.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
First of all our intention was to verify the correlation between tax compliance and tax morale. A central question in the tax compliance literature is why so many people pay their taxes although fines and audit probability are low. One key determinant might be tax morale, the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes. With data from the TOS 1987 we have found a significant correlation between tax evasion and tax morale. To check the sensitivity of the results, we used over-deduction and underdeclaration of the income as dependent variable. Furthermore we used a broad variety of proxies to measure tax morale. In all cases, the coefficient was significant, controlling for a variety of factors.
Furthermore, in the tax compliance literature tax morale is rarely discussed and mostly as a residual explanation without referring to factors that shape tax morale. Although the data from the TOS are not new, it offers almost the only possibility to study a large variety of tax context factors. We provide evidence on the impact of factors that shape tax morale. Positive attitudes towards tax authority and tax system significantly increase tax morale. On the other hand, complexity has not a significant effect on tax morale. The awareness of tax issues correlates with a lower tax morale. However, the coefficient was not significant in all the cases. Trust in public officials and other people on the contrary had a highly significant positive effect on tax morale. Finally, a higher sense of obedience leads to a higher tax morale.
According to the results, tax morale seems to be a key determinant in enhancing tax compliance. There are a variety of policies beside coercion that help to increase tax morale and thus tax compliance. More empirical work is needed to better understand tax morale. Similar to this paper, most of the empirical insights in the tax compliance literature have been gained with data sets from the United States. It remains the question to which extent the empirical findings from the United States can be generalised. The lack of empirical evidence in the tax compliance literature integrating regions as Europe, Africa, Latin America and Asia has to be reduced in the future. It could be hypothesised that the effects found in this paper with U.S. data might be similar for the European countries, as many institutional components are comparable to the United States. However, it would be interesting to check the robustness of these results in developing countries where noncompliance and tax morale seem to be real problems (Torgler 2003, Alm, Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler 2007) . In general, an excellent method would be to conduct panels or to do regular surveys in different countries, similarly designed as the TOS.
In general, results and conclusions obtained in tax morale research are of considerable importance. First, it can provide insight in a more efficient way of raising revenues since the interaction between the taxpayer and the tax authority is taken into account. Second, this research points to a broader understanding of tax compliance where aspects of deterrence (audits and penalties), government regulation, opportunity costs (migration costs and employment status), the quality of publicly provided goods, the tax system (complexity, progressivity and incidence), treatment of taxpayers by the tax authority (transparency, partnership and generosity) and the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the society should be systematically evaluated.
